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‘the colonial upper houses were an important influence on the design of the Australian 
Senate … and have assisted the maintenance of a culture of strong bicameralism which 
has supported a major and growing role for the Senate. It is too often overlooked in 
Australia that the institutions of national government devised in the Constitutional 
Conventions of the 1890s were not built from scratch but were powerfully shaped by 
the traditions of Australian colonial constitutionalism, within which strong elective 
upper houses were a prominent feature.’ 
Bruce Stone, ‘Bicameralism and Democracy: the Transformation of Australian 











This thesis aims to uncover the extent to which the framers of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia conceived of the Commonwealth Executive as politically 
accountable to the Australian Senate. It explores how, through key financial controls, the 
political accountability of the Commonwealth Executive to the Senate was incorporated into 
the Constitution by the framers, not just in pursuit of federal concerns but also in pursuit of 
broader aims of accountability sourced in the role and benefits of upper chambers in bicameral 
parliamentary systems. This reflected the form of strong bicameralism with which the framers 
were most familiar through their own experience of constitutional practice in Australia’s 
colonial parliaments. The thesis also considers the continuing relevance of the aims of dual 
accountability from Australian constitutional history to the High Court’s interpretation of the 
need to protect a line of accountability to upper chambers in Australia. 
Accordingly, this thesis concentrates on the role of upper houses in Australia’s colonial 
parliaments prior to the Australasian Federal Conventions of 1891 and 1897-98 and on the 
record of the Convention Debates themselves. The investigation concludes that, when the 
framers came to design the Constitution, they transposed many of the ideas they had already 
developed about the appropriate role and benefits of an upper chamber to the new federal 
constitution. Whilst federal concerns were undoubtedly important in devising the role of the 
Senate, the framers were also motivated to include the forms of political accountability with 
which they had experienced under their own bicameral systems. Those systems provided for 
distinct lines of political accountability of governments to upper houses. Such accountability 
had been particularly conspicuous in disputes relating to parliamentary control of public 
finance in Australia’s colonial constitutional history. The thesis also argues that concerns 
regarding accountability to upper chambers that were already present in Australia’s pre-
Federation history have remained relevant to the High Court’s interpretation of the 
accountability of the Commonwealth Executive to the Australian Senate. It concludes with an 
examination of the post-Federation judicial interpretation of this constitutional relationship. 
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